We provide the first local-level empirical analysis of the causal effects of providing tactical weapons and vehicles to local police through the 1033 Program. We employ a novel combination of publicly-available longitudinal data at the county level matched to hand-collected data on citizen complaints. We identify the causal effects by exogenous variation in equipment availability and institutional aspects of the Defense Logistics Agency that affect the acquisition costs by local police. Our results indicate that the effects of the 1033 Program are beneficial and consistent with it's stated objectives.
The possession and use of tactical military equipment by police departments has become a contentious issue, both politically and philosophically. Lasting images in the wake of the August 2014 protests in Ferguson, Missouri, showed riot-gear clad police, framed by armored personnel carriers and carrying assault rifles standing down angry (mostly minority) protesters. Missouri Senator Claire McCaskill claimed "Giving military-grade weapons to every police force and every officer comes with costs. Officers dressed in military fatigues will not be viewed as partners in any community" (Grossman, 2014) . Responding to these concerns, President Obama recently signed an executive order to create federal oversight on police acquisition and use of military equipment (Liptak, 2014) .
Since the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1997, the US Department of Defense's Law Enforcement Support Office (LESO) has provided more than $5.4 billion in surplus military gear to local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in what is known as the 1033 Program.
1 Police departments voluntarily apply to receive such things as clothing, optics, guns, tools, grenade launchers, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and mine-resistant vehicles (MRVs) that have either been taken out of service or are no longer needed in reserve stocks. Importantly, these items are provided at no cost other than the transportation cost incurred by local LEAs. The program can be thought of as a well-intentioned recycling program for tactical equipment. If these tactical items are used judiciously, this program can enhance the provision of public safety services by providing necessary capital to assist law enforcement efforts at a nominal price of zero. The transfer of surplus (and paid-for) tactical equipment to local LEAs is a grant-in-kind that expands the set of resources available for local law enforcement, potentially freeing resources to support other public services. If LEAs can gain additional use from the gear, or if the acquired items are substitutes for what might have otherwise been purchased using local tax dollars, the 1033 Program is at least weakly welfare-improving, insofar as local resident tastes are reflected in acquisition decisions. These capital inputs also help law enforcement officers provide a show of force that can potentially serve as a deterrent to crime, or simply improve existing officers' ability to arrest criminals. Previous work in the economics literature has evaluated the effects of expanding police department budgets, either monetarily or with funds earmarked for personnel, finding that increased resources can lead to reduced crime (Evans and Owens, 2007; Machin and Marie, 2011) . Previous work has also shown to varying degrees that federally funded increases in local police deployment after a terrorist event reduces criminal activity (DiTella and Schargradosky, 2004; Klick and Tabarrok, 2005; Draka et al., 2011; Chalfin and McCrary, 2016) .
Alternatively, the 1033 Program could reduce welfare. If the decision to acquire additional gear does not reflect the tastes and preferences of members of the community, but instead appointed or elected officials (including law enforcement officials), inefficiencies can arise in the supply of public safety. This could manifest through emboldened law enforcement officials who become overly aggressive; a better-armed officer might be marginally more likely to cross the line into excessive force or exhibit other forms of moral hazard.
Despite the 1033 Program's size and scope, this paper along with Bove and Gavrilova (2015) is the first to evaluate the consequences of local LEAs acquiring military armaments. The primary reason for this gap in the literature is the lack of quality data, as evidenced by the fact that the only broad-based analysis to date uses state-level data (Wickes, 2015) . We construct a panel of county-level data, matching gear acquisition data from LESO to a variety of features of local law enforcement to provide what we believe to be the first empirical analysis of the effects of local receipt of surplus military vehicles and tactical weapons. We focus on an empirical investigation of two primary research questions. First, what are the benefits of acquiring tactical items? Do these tactical items reduce crime rates, enhance arrest productivity, or yield protective benefits to police officers? Second, is there evidence that acquiring these items affects citizen complaints or offender deaths?
Clearly, there are reasons to be concerned about the endogeneity of departments' decisions to acquire vehicles and tactical weapons. Similar to concerns raised by Knight (2002) , time-varying unobservable factors will clearly influence both the decision to acquire these items and any local law enforcement outcome of interest. We are able to identify the causal effects of the 1033 Program using the combination of exogenous variation in the availability of weapons and vehicles and exogenous cross-sectional variation in the costs to LEAs of acquiring these items (Nunn and Qian, 2011) . From several conversations with the DLA, we learned that the availability and disposition of these items are determined entirely by military concerns and cost-minimization by the Department of Defense, without regard to any aspect of local criminal activity or law enforcement.
In addition to providing the first causal analysis of the effects of issuing tactical weapons and vehicles through the 1033 Program to local LEAs, we make several other useful contributions to the existing literature. First, the 1033 Program provides an excellent case study on the effects of transfers of specific forms of capital from the federal government to state and local governments (specifically, from the US Department of Defense to local LEAs). While significant research has explored the importance and effects of financial grants on law enforcement as well as other state and local services, we are aware of no published work that has considered this type of specific capital input. The 1033 Program fundamentally differs from the grants in previous studies in that it only provides capital, and capital of a very specific nature at that. This is an unconditional grant that requires no formal match from the recipient community.
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Second, this paper and Bove and Gavrilova (2015) contribute to the growing literature on the deterrent effects of guns and other law enforcement capital. Where Duggan (2001) examined the effects of more guns among the populace, we examine the effects of increasinglyarmed police forces on criminal activity.
Third, while previous work on the expansion of law enforcement has focused on societal benefits (e.g., deterrence), we are the first to explore empirically whether the issuance of tactical hardware through the 1033 Program affects citizen complaints or offender deaths.
Finally, we construct a detailed longitudinal county-level data set that combines publiclyavailable sources with hand-collected information on citizen complaints gathered from over 900 annual reports from police departments around the country. Unfortunately, data on citizen complaints against police are not collected in any centralized, systematic fashion.
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We merge these data at the county level with comprehensive data on receipt of tactical gear from LESO, reported crimes, arrests, and clearances from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, and economic data from the U.S. Department of Census and Bureau of Economic Analysis.
We find that overall, the acquisition of tactical items by law enforcement yields benefits for the communities they serve. We find that a 1 percent increase in the number of tactical items acquired leads to a 0.27 percent decrease in complaints against police. We also find that acquiring tactical items yields some non-trivial protection for police. Specifically, we find that a 1 percent increase in tactical items acquired leads to a 0.03% decrease in the probability of officers being assaulted with a gun and a 0.025 percent decrease in the probability that an officer is killed in the line of duty. We do not find evidence that acquiring tactical items of any type leads to increases in offender deaths at the extensive or intensive margin. Consistent with Bove and Gavrilova (2015) , we find some evidence of deterrent effects from acquiring tactical items, although we have some concerns about the validity of our specification for these particular outcomes. We do find evidence that acquiring tactical items improves police productivity, but only of a particular sort. As expected, tactical items do not prove beneficial in helping police solve reported crimes (homicide, robbery, assault, etc.) but are helpful in increasing arrests for drug sales and weapons possession. In short, we find that contrary to the popular narrative, the recycling of military hardware through the 1033 program has causal benefits to the provision of public safety with minimal adverse consequences.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section I details the institutional factors of the 1033 Program that permit causal identification. We continue with a discussion of our various data collection efforts and estimation sample in Section II. We present our empirical methods and results in Section III. Finally, Section IV concludes with a brief, but important discussion of our findings, including limitations thereof and remarks about external validity.
I Background on 1033
Our identification strategy relies on two sources of exogenous variation in the data. First, the amount of tactical items made available to Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) varies exogenously over time, for reasons unrelated to local law enforcement. Second, police departments face time-invariant exogenous differences in the transaction costs of acquiring these tactical items, depending on their location. The interaction of these two factors (variation in availability and transaction costs) yields variables which affect the amount of military equipment acquired through the 1033 Program, but are uncorrelated with the unobservable factors that affect the outcomes of interest. Validation of our claims of exogenous variation (and subsequent use for instrumentation) relies on institutional details of the 1033 Program and the context of that program within the overall operations of the Defense Logistics Agency. As such, those institutional details are of considerable importance.
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First, the legislation creating the Law Enforcement Support Office and 1033 Program was enacted at a time when large transfers of decommissioned equipment were unlikely. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990 permitted the transfer of military equipment to federal and state agencies engaged in drug interdiction. The 1997 NDAA contained a section (1033), allowing the Law Enforcement Support Office (est. 1995) to expand the transfer of military equipment to local law enforcement for the purposes of enhancing arrest capabilities, with special consideration given to drug enforcement. Second, while the 1033 Program has received considerable attention through recent events involving law enforcement officers, the LESO is a relatively small part of a much larger enterprise. Specifically, the LESO is a part of DLA Disposition Services, which is one of many functions of the DLA, which is in turn a small part of the Department of Defense. From an agency perspective, the DoD and DLA have incentives to place their disposition centers in cities that will minimize their own operating and transportation costs. According to the DLA, most of the items transferred to LEAs through the 1033 Program would be routed through one of 18 Field Activity Centers starred in Figure 1 .
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We argue that the location of these centers is not a function of local crime rates or police/community relations, nor are these locations influenced by recent transfers of tactical equipment. The DLA existed long before the initialization of the 1033 Program. Most of the Field Activity Centers have been open since the 1970s. While the DLA underwent some rebranding in 2010, the last significant infrastructure reorganization of Disposition Services 6 A list of these centers with additional information is in the appendix. 7 While most transfers from DoD to LEAs do occur through Field Activity Centers, some items are transferred directly from military units to the receiving LEA. Essentially, since we use distance from the county centroid to the FAC as our exogenous, time-invariant cost shifter, these occurrences mean we have some measurement error in our instrument. As there is no reason to suggest that these direct transfers are done for any other purpose than logistical convenience, our instruments suffer from some attenuation bias. They are still strong, with first stage F-statistics around 20.
was in the 1990s. It is also true that LEAs (1033 customers) are not the sole, or even primary customers for the DLA Disposition Services Reutilization program. Other military units, Homeland Security, and other Federal Agencies supersede 1033 in order of importance. ROTC programs, Foreign Military Agencies, Civil Air Patrol, Contractors and others also participate in reutilization programs. In addition to the sensitive tactical items that are the focus of this paper, DLA Disposition Services also distributes, transfers, donates or sells clothing and non-tactical equipment. In summary, the location of the Field Activity Centers in most cases predates the 1033 Program. If there are any unknown changes in center locations, we emphasize that the 1033 Program is a non-trivial, but certainly non-dominant part of DLA's overall cost minimization problem.
The proximity of police departments to these centers affects departments' costs when acquiring tactical equipment. Police departments are responsible for all transactional costs when acquiring items through the 1033 program, including evaluating items for suitability and the transportation costs of moving said items from a FAC to their jurisdiction. Ceteris paribus, law enforcement agencies that are closer to FACs will face lower costs of acquiring tactical gear, with respect to both shipping costs and accessibility to shop/evaluate items that are available. The proximity of an LEA to more than one FAC also likely influences their acquisition of tactical items as the department must acquire the item directly from the originating FAC.
8 Therefore, the distance from an LEA to multiple FACs, not just the nearest FAC, can affect the costs of acquiring various types and varieties of tactical equipment.
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The decision of which FAC receives decommissioned tactical items is also made without regard to any concern of civilian law enforcement. When a military unit decides to stop using a piece of equipment, that equipment is processed and transferred to the nearest FAC. The location of the equipment to be possibly acquired by police is entirely determined by the location of the unit transferring the property. When equipment of any type comes to the FAC, the DLA has a 42-day process to determine how to dispose of the item. There is a seven-day administrative processing window, a 14-day window during which DoD and Special Program customers (e.g., 1033) may requisition and remove items from inventory and a 21-day transfer/donation period. At the end of the 42-day window, unclaimed, unwanted items are demilitarized and scrapped. The relatively short window (14 days) that LEA's have to act on a particular item emphasizes the accessibility aspect of proximity to FAC's.
8 A police department in Atlanta, GA that wants a Mine Resistant Vehicle available at the Field Activity Center at Joint Base Lewis-McChord (Tacoma, WA) must send someone to vet that item and pay to have that item transported all the way from Washington State. The DLA will not ship that item to the much closer Warner-Robins AFB FAC.
9 For more information and a discussion about shipping and accessibility costs, see the online appendix.
It is worth noting that the request process for aircraft, armored personnel carriers, firearms, etc., is quite simple and does not appear to require political oversight or public input. The one-to-two page forms amount to a signature from a police chief and a state coordinator, and a very short explanation for why the requested hardware would be useful. Knowledge about the acquisition process is unlikely to affect acquisition of tactical items. Defense Logistics Agency personnel relayed to us in a telephone conversation that their preference was to distribute the available tactical equipment as widely as possible across agencies. In other words, preference is given to agencies that received less hardware in the past. This stated preference contradicts the notion that unobserved heterogeneity in the accumulation of tactical hardware is due to some form of preferred status with the DLA rather than heterogeneity in preferences. The simplicity of the application process, the presence of other customers, the volume of equipment transferred, the short claim window, and the desire to spread equipment around all alleviate concerns about two-way selection.
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We were informed by the Branch Chief of LESO that "We've been able to meet the needs of the state coordinators of the 1033 Program for the last several years."
We therefore contend that the proximity of a law enforcement agency to Field Activity Centers is entirely a function of DoD cost minimization concerns and institutional legacy. The distribution of tactical items among these FACs is also entirely a function of cost minimization and military logistics. The amount of equipment made available to LEAs is attributable entirely to military decisions and the needs of other military agencies. Finally, the distance of a police department to multiple FACs affects the costs of both evaluation and acquiring tactical equipment. These costs are determined by factors unrelated to local unobserved heterogeneity in police community relations, crime rates or police productivity. Figure 1 depicts a map of the total items (adjusted for population) acquired in each county in the contiguous U.S. The darker the shading, the more tactical items a county has received. Two features of the map standout. First, note that the dark regions are generally clustered around the stars (FACs). Second, note that the dark spots are often proximate to multiple FACs even when not particularly close to one FAC. The fact that not all FACs have the same equipment at the same time motivates our use of the proximity to the nearest center and the sixth nearest center as instruments, discussed in the next section. Figure 2 contains a scatter plot of mean log tactical items received, adjusted for population, for twenty bins of counties grouped by distance to the nearest FAC. As the panels show, the counties closest to the centers acquire more items, on average, than counties farther away. While the relationship appears to lose strength among the more remote counties, this is driven by high take up rates at the extensive margin by remote counties. The bottom figure depicts the conditional mean for each bin only the takers. Along the intensive margin, the inverse relationship between distance and acquisition of tactical items holds over all counties.
II Data
Our data are compiled from four sources. Data on equipment issued to LEAs via the 1033 Program are provided directly by the Defense Logistics Agency. Data on annual offenses, arrests, and clearances are taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
11 Demographic and economic data are taken from the United States Census Bureau American Community Survey and Intercensal Estimates. Data on citizen complaints are taken directly from annual reports from police departments. We emphasize that the collection of complaints via annual reports is a contribution in and of itself, as data on citizen complaints across jurisdictions are not compiled in any systematic way. No federal data instrument tracks citizen complaints in a panel context, nor are police required to report them.
II.A Tactical Equipment from the Defense Logistics Agency
The Defense Logistics Agency provided data on all military equipment transferred to local law enforcement agencies. Because transfers of tactical equipment were coded at the county rather than the agency level, our unit of observation is a county. Some of the equipment issued through LESO is relatively uncontroversial, including clothing, storage, tools, and first aid supplies; however, tactical equipment is responsible for approximately 70 percent of the monetary value of goods transferred through the 1033 Program. We categorize tactical equipment into one of eight categories based on NATO Stock Number (NSN) as shown in Table 1 : guns (rifles, shotguns, and pistols), optics, night optics (NVG), grenade launchers, trucks, aircraft, armored personnel carriers (APC), and mine resistant vehicles (MRV). While the first row of Table 1 has some large values, particularly for trucks and NVGs, these disbursements occurred over a 13-year period. These numbers are small compared to single-year values in the most recent years.
Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 2 . The distributions of received guns, optics, and night optics across counties are highly skewed, even when controlling for population differences.
12 We believe these data are accurate as they are reported by the DLA rather than receiving agencies. These data do not capture weapons and tactical equipment independently purchased by police departments, nor do they document the decommissioning of these items.
II.B Crime, Clearance, and Arrest Data from Bureau of Justice Statistics
Data on criminal activity and arrests are taken from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Annual Summary Reports and Offenses and Clearances data from 1997-2012. 13 We normalize all data to the size of the population (per 100,000 individuals). Where available, we use data from UCR Offenses and Clearances, which records reported crimes and cases 'cleared' by arrests for the following crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, assault, gun assault, burglary and vehicle theft. Because the data include reported crimes and arrests conditional on reported crime, we are able to investigate whether acquisition of tactical equipment has deterrent effects (fewer reported crimes) and/or productivity enhancing effects (greater numbers of clearances, conditional on reported crimes). From the Annual Summary Reports, we incorporate data on annual arrests for drug sales, drug possession, weapons charges, and a catch-all category of petty offenses that includes alcohol offenses, public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, suspicion, and loitering. Unlike the reactive nature of the criminal activity reported in the Offenses and Clearances data, these arrests are primarily the result of proactive police work. We include these data to investigate whether acquisition of tactical equipment enhances the effectiveness of law enforcement in drug interdiction or seizing unregistered weapons. Additionally, part of the debate surrounding events in Ferguson pertained to police arresting individuals for petty offenses. If acquisition of tactical equipment is linked to increasingly aggressive or punitive police work, we might expect arrests for small offenses to increase with weapon acquisition.
II.C Complaint Data from Annual Reports
Our empirical work on the potential negative effects of the 1033 Program focuses on citizen complaints as the primary measure of those negative effects. This is a result of both By 2013, the median county in the U.S. had received no advanced optics, compared to a mean of 8.2 pieces of optics equipment per 100,000 population and a max of 1,421 pieces of optical equipment.
13 UCR data has a long history in the economics literature, including Glaeser et al. (1996) ; Levitt (1997 Levitt ( , 1998 ; Bronars and Lott (1998) ; Dezhbakhsh and Rubin (1998) ; Grogger and Willis (2000) ; Abrams (2012) , and Depetris-Chauvin (2015) data availability issues and a desire for a measure of overall representativeness of policecommunity relations.
14 Data on citizen complaints were compiled from published annual reports of police departments. Most of the 100 largest cities in the United States are represented in these data as are sheriff's departments from populous counties. We chose total citizen complaints as our measure for negative externalities from police departments. In some cases, statistics on the disposition of these claims were available, but the differences in standards/disposition of these complaints made cross-departmental comparisons infeasible.
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II.D Demographic and Economic Data
We incorporate county population data by race from the U.S. Census Bureau. Intercensal population estimates are used as the denominators for arrest rates and normalizing the tactical equipment purchased by local police departments. We also include labor force participation data, unemployment rate, and per capita personal income by county from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. As our empirical approach allows, we also control for land area and population density of each county.
14 More extreme indicators such as arrest-related deaths (ARDs) and officer-involved shootings (OISs) are fortunately uncommon events. A small number of either of these does not necessarily indicate a systematic problem between police and the public. Small numbers notwithstanding, available data on ARDs and OISs are simply unreliable. The FBI claimed that the number of justifiable homicides averaged 400 per year, however, revisions by Bureau of Justice Statics and a subsequent study from Research Triangle International (RTI) placed the true number of deaths by law enforcement closer to 800 and then 1,200 per year (Office of Justice Programs, 2011; Banks et al., 2015) . The RTI report found that coverage of the universe of law enforcement killings in the existing data (Arrest Related Deaths and Supplementary Homicide Reports) was less than 50 percent. Second, data on ARDs are only released at the state level and therefore do not capture important sub-state variation in gear acquisition, crime rates, and adverse outcomes. Finally, ARDs and OISs are ambiguous outcomes, as neither the circumstances of the shooting (e.g., whether weapons were present) nor the fault are observed. Objective violent outcomes, while controversial, may be entirely justified or necessary. Further, increases in ARDs or OISs may also be a function of criminal behavior not captured by crime frequency statistics, rather than police practices. If the acquisition of tactical equipment is driven by the need to provide public safety in response to a small number of truly violent criminals, using ARDs and OISs as outcomes may create misleading results.
15 While the compilation of these data is a contribution in and of itself, two features of the data limit the interpretation of our empirical findings and motivate policy recommendations with respect to transparency. First, data on complaints are endogenously available. Not all departments publish annual reports, let alone data on citizen complaints in their annual reports. Requests for information from several departments were either ignored or responded to with large amounts of qualitative information, perhaps indicating that no statistical analysis had been conducted on citizen complaints. The counties with agencies that do report citizen complaints are approximately 10 times as large at the mean and 20 times as large at the median as the counties that do not report citizen complaints. Although we only have complaints for a relatively small number of counties (100), those counties contain approximately 25 percent of the U.S. Population. In an online data appendix (available upon request), we document the results of our search for complaint data from major municipalities and sheriff's offices in all counties with populations greater than 500,000. Additional information on the differences in acquisition of tactical equipment by complaint reporting and non-reporting counties is available in the same appendix.
III Identification and Empirical Analysis
We empirically evaluate several aspects of the 1033 Program with respect to tactical equipment, in two broad categories. First, we evaluate whether there is evidence of negative externalities from the 1033 Program, as measured by total complaints and offender deaths. Second, we evaluate whether there is evidence of positive effects from the issuance of tactical weapons, specifically that these items yield deterrent or productivity enhancing effects. Empirically, we consider outcomes as stemming from the following model:
where O jt is the outcome of interest, E j,t−1 is the lagged stock of acquired tactical equipment in a particular jurisdiction, X jt is a vector of county exogenous characteristics including percapita personal income, the unemployment, labor force participation, and L j,t−1 includes lagged crime (or arrest) rates and lagged police officers assaulted and killed. 16 In all of these equations, the coefficient of interest is β 1 . For all outcomes, and all specifications, this coefficient may be biased due to time varying correlation between the acquisition of tactical equipment and the error term, even controlling for the jurisdictional fixed effect. This bias may stem from changing departmental culture, policy, personnel or other omitted, unobservable factors that may lead to increased intensity of tactical equipment acquisition and jurisdictional outcomes, desirable or otherwise. Our identification strategy relies on instruments constructed from exogenous timeinvariant cost shifters (distance to Field Activity Centers) interacted with exogenously changing amounts of tactical items made available through the 1033 Program, similar in concept to Nunn and Qian (2011) . The DLA relayed two other important factors: counties with large land areas were actively encouraged to participate in this program as were counties that were designated High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA). We therefore include interaction terms between the availability of tactical items and the jurisdiction's land area and an indicator for having ever been designated as a HIDTA.
17 Our first stage can therefore 16 The E and L variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity bias. 17 HIDTAs constitute 27% of the counties in the United States and 60% of the population. Counties that were federally designated as High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas were specifically encouraged by the 1033 program to participate. As the stated purpose of the 1033 program was to provide support for drug interdiction, priority was given to counties with this designation. We reemphasize, however, that the manager of the 1033 program relayed that there was no two-way selection program. The needs of all law enforcement customers were met, it was simply a matter of who got preference for particular items. Second, counties with large land areas were encouraged to participate, under the idea that conditional on population, covering larger geographic areas requires more capital (optics, vehicles, etc). Therefore, these be expressed as:
where s denotes a specific equipment type and D k j denotes the inverse distance from the centroid of county j to the k th closest field activity center. As discussed in Section I not all centers have the same equipment (and much of this equipment is specialized) during a given period. For a specific item that a department desires, it is unclear from which center the item in question will originate. Proximity to not just one center, but multiple centers, affects the average costs of evaluating and acquiring tactical items. To capture the effects of proximity to multiple centers, we include the inverse distance to the sixth nearest FAC as in our set of instruments, as proximity to the sixth closest center captures information about the proximity of the second through fifth nearest centers. Note that proximity to a Field Activity Center does not equate to proximity to a military base.
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The results of our first stage are detailed below in Table 3 , which contains results from regressions of the acquisition of tactical equipment of each type on our usual control variables and our instruments. We evaluate total items received, and three broad categories of tactical items: weapons (guns and grenade launchers), optics (day sights and night optics), and vehicles (military trucks, aircraft, mine resistant vehicles and armored personnel carriers). The reported F-statistics are the joint significance tests of our instruments. 19, 20 Note that for the higher volume items, guns and optics, proximity to the nearest center is a positive predictor of acquiring tactical items. For more heterogeneous categories, optics and vehicles, proximity to the sixth center has a positive effect on item acquisition. Finally, for vehicles, which are low volume and heterogeneous, proximity to multiple centers is important, but proximity to the nearest is not. As our model is overidentified, we empirically test our claims of validity made in Section I. As additional evidence, we examine a particular event, the large release of guns in 2006.
counties were encouraged to participate to the point where land area and HIDTA designation were included on the application forms submitted when requesting a transfer of equipment. In our sample, HIDTA status and land area are time invariant. As our first stage includes county level fixed effects, any concerns about unobservables related to these factors should be mitigated. Additionally, as our model is overidentified, we provide test statistics on instrument validity for all second-stage results.
18 There are over 200 U.S. military installations in the contiguous 48 states and at least one in every state. While many counties are proximate to a military base or installation, far fewer are proximate to a Field Activity Center.
19 We appeal to the Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb that an F-statistic greater than 10 indicates a reasonably strong instrument.
20 While inverse distance is our preferred measure of proximity, we have verified that our results are consistent both in sign and significance when employing a linear-spline distance measure, and a quadratic function of proximity. Results are available upon request. More guns were released through the 1033 program in 2006 than any other year. Figure 3 plots the annual mean of guns acquired, arrest rates for drug sales and weapons charges, assault rates on police officers, logged complaint rates, and per-capita personal income for the 310 counties (decile) nearest to an FAC and the same number of counties the farthest from an FAC. As the event study shows, while the two sets of counties exhibit considerable differences in acquisition of guns, they do not exhibit sudden changes in our outcomes of interest coincident with the acquisition of guns.
III.A Does the Acquisition of Tactical Equipment Increase Citizen
Complaints? Table 4 contains our results for negative effects from the 1033 Program, for which our measure is citizen complaints. We regress contemporaneous log per-capita complaints on lagged arrest rates and lagged variables for tactical equipment to mitigate simultaneity bias. We instrument for lagged per-capita stocks of tactical equipment as discussed above. All results also include year fixed effects and controls for lagged reported crime rates and arrest rates to control for the police-public contact rates, as well as economic and demographic controls such as unemployment rates. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. In the top row, the effects of tactical items on citizen complaints are not statistically significantly different from zero. When we instrument for tactical items, however, the results for all types of tactical items become negative and significant. Our results indicate that a 1 percent In the second through fifth columns, we address the heterogeneous effects of tactical items of different types. While the effect of weapons is still negative and significant, it has the smallest magnitude. Our results indicate that all types of tactical items reduce complaints. While we recommend caution in interpreting the effect of combat vehicles (Mine Resistant Vehicles and Armored Personnel Carriers), even this most controversial sort of equipment does not lead to increased complaints.
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One could imagine that acquiring military hardware could induce two behavioral changes in police that would reduce complaints. If police who acquire these armaments behave very aggressively, citizens may be too intimidated to complain. Alternatively, if better armed police approach potential conflict situations knowing they have the upper hand, they may be less likely to engage in aggressive behavior. As a triangulation point, we consider the effects of acquiring tactical items on arrest related deaths. These data were provided by Bove and Gavrilova. While we cannot confirm the latter, our results in Table 5 , where we model the effects of tactical items on arrest related deaths, do not support the former. If the former was true, we would expect a positive significant effect of acquiring tactical items on offender deaths. While none of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant in either specification (log deaths or any deaths), all point estimates are negative. Therefore, while we cannot claim that acquiring tactical items reduces offender deaths, consistent with Bove and Gavrilova, we do not find evidence that these items lead to increased police violence. for lagged crime rates, economic controls, and county fixed effects p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 21 We had concerns about lagged complaints affecting the acquisition of tactical items or that evolving departmental cultures would lead to serial correlation in the errors, creating problems for fixed effects models. As such, we repeated the analysis in Table 4 using an Arellano-Bover-Blundell-Bond dynamic panel specification. The results are available upon request, but the coefficients for total items and weapons are negative and significant. The estimates for optics and vehicles are insignificant. While the dynamic panel results are weaker, they are consistent with the general negative result discussed here. Having found no evidence that issuance of tactical items to police has any negative causal effects, we examine whether acquiring tactical items enhances the production of public safety. We consider three categories of outcomes: deterrence, arrest productivity, and protection effects for law enforcement officers.
First, if criminals are aware that law enforcement agencies have this equipment, there may be some deterrent effect if tactical equipment increases either the probability or unpleasantness of arrest (Becker, 1974) . Second, if military gear makes police better at their jobs, counties receiving tactical items may be able to close more cases, conditional on crime rates. Third, the stated objective of the 1033 program was to enhance the drug interdiction efforts of local police. If these items are accomplishing that task, we should find a causal relationship between acquisition of tactical items and arrests for drug or weapons charges. Finally, we evaluate whether acquiring tactical items protects the human capital engaged in providing public safety, the officers themselves. Table 6 contains the results regarding the effect of receiving tactical items on crime rates. We consider three outcomes also considered by Bove and Gavrilova (2015) (assault, vehicle theft, and robbery), but also examine homicide and gun assaults. For the three types of crime considered in both papers, the signs and significance of the coefficient are consistent. 0.000 0.002 0.380 0.000 0.000 Regressions include controls for lagged arrest rates, economic controls, county and year fixed effects p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 22 When we use value of equipment to aggregate as in Bove and Gavrilova, rather than total items, our estimated magnitudes decrease. Using our estimates, we would not reject the null that our values equal those of Bove and Gavrilova. Our results on this outcome should be interpreted with caution, however, as the reported p-values for J statistic (testing for instrument validity) are almost always sufficiently small to warrant rejecting the null that our instruments are valid.
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23 Any lingering differences between our results and those of Bove and Gavrilova can likely be attributed to Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE). It is likely that police departments exhibit heterogeneous treatment effects. For example, the police department in a city with high rates of violent crime and a large drug problem might respond very differently to a randomly assigned shipment of tactical items than a department in a less troubled city. In the case of heterogeneous treatment effects, LATE properties of instruments must be taken into consideration when interpreting results. Bove and Gavrilova instrument for the value of items received with the proportion of years in the sample period that a county asks for any items. If the departments that participate in the program are in some way more proactive or more actively engaged with using outside resources to reduce crime, they will exhibit different treatment effects than those departments likely affected by our instrument. The departments likely most affected by our instrument should be thought of as 'marginal' takers of equipment. They only engage in the 1033 program insofar as items are abundant and convenient to acquire at a nominal price of zero. Table 7 contains our results of regressions evaluating the effect of receiving tactical items on productivity, as measured by 'closures' of substantiated reported crimes. All specifications are as detailed in equations (1) and (2). While we report the results (for consistency) for vehicle theft, we do not trust our results for this outcome, or assaults, as our instruments appear invalid. Where valid, as in the first three columns, our results generally indicate that tactical items do not enhance police departments ability to close cases involving violent crime. While the signs in the first three columns are all positive, only one coefficient, the effect of weapons on robbery closures, is statistically significant. This result is not surprising, given that tactical items do not make anyone smarter, more resourceful, or otherwise better able to solve reported crimes.
Where tactical items do appear to enhance productivity is in the categories of crime that are not typically reported, but rather addressed through proactive measures (i.e. drug interdiction and weapons seizures). Table 8 contains the results for regressions with arrests for drug sales, drug possession, weapons charges, and petty offenses as the dependent variables. For these outcomes, we still maintain our instrumentation strategy, but employ an Arellano-Bover-Blundell-Bond dynamic panel specification. If acquisition of tactical items affects the ability of police departments to engage in drug interdiction, that should affect both the criminal landscape in subsequent periods and also future decisions regarding the Data from UCR Annual Summary Reports, using Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond Estimator (xtdpsys). Tactical equipment variables are treated as endogenous variables.
The same set of instruments as in previous regressions, but with up to three lags are used here.
Results are not sensitive to addition/subtraction of lags, nor reclassification of groups of variables. All regressions control for lagged crime rates, economic variables, county and time fixed effects Effects of tactical Items are estimated in separate regressions, rather than jointly.
p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 acquisition of tactical items, so a dynamic panel approach is necessary. We find that acquisition of tactical items leads to more arrests for all four criminal activities, with magnitudes that are consistent with the objectives of the 1033 program. A 1 percent increase in tactical items leads to a 0.16 percent increase in arrests for drug sales. The estimated magnitude of the effect on arrests for drug sales is approximately twice that of drug possession. Further, a 1 percent increase in tactical items leads to a 0.1 percent increase in arrests for weapons. While the estimated effect of tactical items on petty arrests is positive and significant, it is by far the smallest of the four categories. Considering the three main categories of tactical items, the effect of weapons is significant for all four categories. For optics, the results are strongest for arrests for weapons and drug sales, but are marginally significant for petty offenses. Vehicles are only significant for weapons arrests. While guns may be useful in combating any street crime, optics and vehicles are primarily useful for SWAT incursions where suspects may be armed, hence the linkage to weapons arrests. These results in general are consistent with the stated goal of the 1033 program to assist with drug interdiction. Finally, we evaluate whether the disbursement of tactical items through the 1033 program yields benefits in the form of protection for police officers. Returning to our Instrumental Variables Fixed Effect specification, Table 9 shows that all types of tactical items yield protection benefits for police officers at both the intensive and extensive margin. A one percent increase in tactical items decreases gun assaults on police officers by 0.1 percent, and decreases the probability of any gun assaults on officers by 0.03 percent. While these magnitudes are small, given that the 1033 program amounts to a recycling program for military hardware, these protection benefits are occurring at virtually no cost to society. While the estimated coefficients of acquiring tactical items are negative for all estimates involving officers killed in the line of duty, they are only statistically significant for specifications modeling whether there were any deaths.
IV Discussion
In this paper, we empirically investigate the effect of local law enforcement agencies' acquisition of tactical weapons and vehicles from the military. We capitalize on institutional knowledge about the logistics of the 1033 program to identify shifters of cost (proximity) and priority (land area and HIDTA designation) that enable us to isolate the causal effects of the issuance of these items.
In the popular press and in our society, two divergent narratives have emerged around the 1033 Program and the apparent militarization of police. One narrative centers around the necessity of these armaments as an input to the production of public safety from the modern, dangerous, well-armed violent or drug criminal. While this paper does not directly address need per se, we do find that the tactical items issued through the 1033 program reduce assaults on and deaths of police officers, assist in drug interdiction, and may have deterrent effects on crime. All of these are consistent with the objectives of the 1033 program. The other narrative centers around the availability of tactical equipment transforming yesterday's community policeman into a thug. Our findings contradict that narrative. Specifically, we find that acquiring tactical items reduces citizen complaints. The statistically insignificant results (with negative signs) on offender deaths indicate that an 'intimidation channel' is highly unlikely.
There are five caveats that must be kept in mind when interpreting these results. First, there are almost surely exceptions to these findings. It is entirely possible that in certain jurisdictions these armaments are necessary, have not increased the efficacy of drug interdiction, or have led directly to increased violence by police against civilians. In other words, our findings do not necessarily mean that saturating our local law enforcement agencies with military hardware is good policy. In conjunction, the second limitation is that our results are likely a local average treatment effect. We do interpret our estimates as causal effects, but they are mainly valid for departments for whom access/evaluation/shipping costs are a pivotal factor. Departments with a militaristic culture or a very community-focused culture would likely exhibit different treatment effects. Third, we do not know what tactical items p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 police departments' purchase outside the 1033 program. If there is positive correlation between 1033 acquisitions and outside purchases, our results may overstate the benefits of the 1033 program. While it is unknowable whether there is an associative positive or negative correlation between items acquired inside/outside the 1033 program, we are relying on our instruments to address that omitted variable problem to provide causal estimates of the effects of the 1033 program. We emphasize that our results are about the 1033 program alone rather than a referendum on police militarization. Fourth, these results should not be used to diminish concerns about police community relations, the role of police in our society, violence against civilians by police or vice versa. However, the tactical items issued through the 1033 program have become a visual representation of the ongoing controversy in our society, to the point where the military hardware is viewed as a catalyst of mistrust and excessive force. While we need to have these philosophical conversations as a society, our results refute the view that the 1033 program is in some way responsible for these social ills.
Finally, from a policy perspective, the most significant recommendation we offer is related to basic transparency. Police departments are publicly-funded for the purpose of providing a very hazardous public service, and while great police work can have positive effects on a community, careless policing can have detrimental effects. While data on crime statistics are easy to find, data on citizen complaints can be much more difficult or impossible to find. We appreciate the LEAs that have made these data publicly available, but feel these data should be uniformly reported and universally available, particularly for large cities. We also recognize that our data are incomplete, in that many small LEAs simply do not have the resources to consistently compile and post up-to-date statistics. Sheriffs, who are in many instances elected officials, have even less incentive to report complaints (and do so at a much lower frequency). Sheriff's departments and municipal police departments often coexist within large counties, but may have very different cultures. Almost no departments reported data in a transparent way on SWAT deployments (another candidate measure of police/military activity), officer-involved shootings, or arrest-related deaths. While the FBI has data on arrest-related deaths, these data are voluntarily and selectively recorded and only available at the state level. We are certainly sympathetic to the desire to avoid scrutiny and protect information that could be useful to nascent criminals and cynical citizens, but data on negative outcomes are necessary to form a comprehensive picture of the quality of the service paid for and provided to the public.
